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ABSTRACT 
The DI operates as a rent-sharing arrangement. This paper argues that such an 
arrangement can operate effectively only if the appropriate level of deposits is 
mobilized towards this end, and highlights the inevitable outcome: fierce 
competition for deposits amongst the Eurozone MSs. To deepen the argument data 
analysis is provided indicating the existence of regulatory subsidy in the form of 
implicit though effective DI, moral hazard and adverse selection. Against this 
background, the EU Commission promotes the creation of an EDIS as the third pillar 
of the BU. The EDIS proposal is considered by Economic institutions in strictly 
economic terms. Yet, the EP promotes a restrictive course supporting a liquidity 
providing EDIS. The paper argues that such an EDIS would render regulatory subsidy 
and rent-seeking behavior persisting, by allowing national policies to be pursued 
with considerable discretionary power and in the context of increasing competition 
for deposits. This would run contrary to the BU objectives and constitute a major 
failure of the programme. 
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The European Deposite Insurance in Perspective 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to provide an analytical insight of the European 
Deposit Insurance (DI) configuration and foresee the way ahead. DI, 
especially when it covers a vast segment of bank liabilities, constitutes an ex 
ante commitment by the government to protect depositors against all 
sources of loss. Empirical evidence – both historical and contemporary — 
demonstrates that the DI costs offset its potential economic efficiency gains. 
DI operates as a rent-sharing arrangement with its key feature the growth of 
economic rents in the hands of depositors, banks and borrowers, with all 
parties seeing a value in enduring their relationship to the extent that these 
rents are shared. 
 
However, the national DI arrangements can function successfully only if they 
attract the appropriate level of deposits, inevitably stimulating fierce 
competition for deposits amongst the eurozone Member States (MS). 
Governments are involved in an uncoordinated policy game wherein decide 
on the DI conditions, in order to attract deposits which are necessary for the 
rent-sharing arrangement to run. The important features of the explicit 
European DI can be explained by the relations of conflict or cooperation 
amongst the rational decision makers: the MS Governments. 
Within this context, the European Commission in November 2015 published 
a legislative proposal for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), as the 
third pillar of the Banking Union (BU), in order to complete its institutional 
setup and facilitate the realisation of its objectives. Although the EDIS 
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proposal is promoted and deemed by Economic institutions in a pure 
economic frame, the European Parliament (EP) restraining and conditional 
approach reflects the political consideration of DI. What is the feasible form 
of EDIS? Would it be able to fulfill its objectives? What are its deficiencies? 
What is the impact of EU integration on the political/economic feasibility of 
government subsidies for banks? What are the implications? This paper is an 
attempt to answer these questions. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the 
theoretical arguments for and against DI, examines relevant empirical 
evidence and illustrates the DI as a rent-sharing arrangement. Section 3 
considers the European DI as a game of strategy amongst EU Member States. 
Section 4 assesses the impact of sovereigns’ fiscal strength on the credibility 
of DI and deposit flows across the Eurozone. A model of deposits is 
developed in this respect. This, in turn, provides significant insight on the 
existence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Section 5 presents and 
analyses the proposal for EDIS within the theoretical framework. Section 6, 
then, concludes with an analysis of the main results. 
 
2. DI Theoretical and Empirical Considerations  
2.1  DI Theories: The Economic Approach 
DI is an indispensable attribute of banking regulation acknowledged by 
prominent International institutions (e.g. the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, and the EU). The economic approach reveals that liability 
insurance diminishes systemic liquidity risk and thus it may improve the 
efficient management of the banking system. Nevertheless, this potential 
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advantage emerges with significant drawbacks in terms of moral hazard and 
adverse-selection costs, which amplify essential insolvency risk, either due to 
greater conscious risk assumed by bankers (moral hazard) or through a raise 
of bankers acting imprudently. It is the empirical evidence that would reveal 
whether bank liability insurance, as an end result reduces or increases risk in 
the banking system. 
 
Banks liquidity risk emerges by the issuance of short term demandable debt 
contracts with shorter maturities than banks’ assets. This is essentially to the 
so-called “maturity mismatch” of banking attributable to  two core  banking 
processes: (a) the  utilisation of  information about borrowers (the so-called 
“delegated monitoring” operation of banks), and (b) the formation of banks’ 
claims and their subsequent utilisation as transacting media by uniformed 
people concerning the bank underlying value. 
 
The model of principal-agent conflict highlights the incentive to create 
maturity mismatch as a means of using deposits to discipline bankers’ 
behavior. In principal–agent models, the principal bears agency costs in terms 
of a strictly positive rent attracted by the agent - i.e. his payoff exceeds his 
reservation utility, which he would obtain in case of no contract (Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002). Accordingly, the principal, with the aim to reduce the 
agency costs, normally endorses a second-best solution that differs from the 
economically optimal first-best solution – which would be accomplished in 
the case of perfect information. Applying this model to banking, the bankers 
(i.e. the agents) play a dynamic role in deciding on loans and managing 
respective risks, but where proceedings and implications are not observable 
at no cost to depositors or perspective depositors (i.e. the principals). 
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Banks’ capacity to proficiently channel funds to their optimum uses entails 
banks producing a huge quantity of low-risk, short-term claims to finance 
their risky assets. Of course, such low-risk, short-term or demandable claims 
(deposits) may experience a substantial risk increase in the course of a severe 
economic outlook which would inevitably affect the underlying value of 
banks’ assets. In this case, risk sensitive depositors would respond by 
withdrawing some of their deposits, contributing to banks’ de-leverage until 
depositor confidence is restored. Unguaranteed banks are subject exactly to 
this form of market discipline by risk-intolerant depositors (Martinez-Peria, 
Soledad and Schmukler, 2001; Calomiris and Wilson, 2004; Calomiris and 
Carlson, 2016a). 
 
The process of market discipline is costly (Diamond and Rajan, 2009). A 
sudden run on deposits withdrawal contributes to a credit crunch with severe 
recessionary effects, as banks and consumers seek to dispose of risky assets 
to hold up their financial positions (Adrian and Shin, 2009; Mitchener and 
Richardson, 2015; Calomiris and Carlson, 2016b). Banks’ maturity 
transformation involves benefits but also costs. The latter arise in the form of 
banking liquidity risk with severe repercussions for the real economy if and 
when realised. DI eradicates liquidity risk in the banking system and evades 
the intensification of recessionary effects by disincentivising depositors to run 
to banks with default risk increase in the process of market discipline. The 
synchronised provision of liquidity to both depositors and borrowers is 
exclusively achievable by the operation of DI. In case of principal-agent 
conflicts which induce second best solutions, government intervention is 
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required to attain the socially optimal first solution. This is the particular role 
of DI. 
 
Nevertheless, DI removes market discipline by eliminating the depositors’ 
incentive as to the selection of banks to place their deposits, giving space to 
incompetent bankers (Acharya and Thakor, 2016). Excessive risk taking 
practices may be allowed to flourish. Deposit insurance may even incentivise 
undisciplined bankers to raise risk deliberately in anticipation of losses, in 
order to take full advantage of the deposit insurance safeguard (Merton, 
1977). 
 
DI is economically efficient if its benefits in terms of reducing the liquidity risk 
prevail over the costs of moral hazard and adverse selection. This depends on 
design features that prevent moral hazard and adverse selection and/or on 
the regulatory and supervisory system aptitude to efficiently remove deposit 
insurance subsidies and abuses by guaranteed banks. Partial and conditional 
protection has proven superior to either unrestricted DI or non-DI. The critical 
attribute of the bank safety net optimal design to preserve market discipline 
and enhance stability is the provisional aspect of bank support based on the 
nature of the underline shock: systemic shock losses should be absorbed, 
while idiosyncratic shocks losses should be allowed (Acharya and Thakor, 
2016). Furthermore, in principle, prudential regulation and supervision may 
eradicate deposit insurance negative aspects in terms of moral-hazard and 
adverse-selection and thus restore discipline. This argument is assessed in 
practice later on. 
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2.2  Empirical evidence 
Ample empirical evidence until approximately 20th century ending 
demonstrates that almost unconditional DI seems to provide strong 
incentives to even cautiously managed banks to enhance asset risk and 
leverage and generate moral hazard. More specifically: 
 
A thorough empirical study of a large group of countries from 1980 to 1995 
illustrates that explicit DI tends to undermine bank stability (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and  Detragiache, 2005). In the US, DI systems in early 20th century 
eradicated market discipline and produced severe moral hazard, allowing 
protected banks, regardless of their prudence, to reap deposits away from 
unprotected counterparts (Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016). Evidence from the 
same country in the late 20th century indicates that commercial banks have a 
unique advantage in providing loan commitments with fixed-formula floating 
interest rates mainly due to their access to DI (Booth, 2004). In Germany, 
previously protected savings bank, following the elimination of their DI 
coverage, brought to a halt their riskiest borrowers and restructured their 
liability portfolio away from risk- sensitive debt instruments (Gropp, Gruendls 
and Guettler, 2014). More specifically, DI seems to increase the lending-
deposit spread in banking with the main effect emerging not from the deposit 
side, but from an increase in the lending rate, demonstrating the existence of 
moral hazard linked to this instrument (Carapella and Di Giorgio, 2004). 
Generous DI harmed financial conditions and had a negative impact on the 
growth of the financial system across several countries (Cull, Senbet and 
Sorge, 2005). 
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Despite the fact that the drawbacks of unrestricted and unconditional DI 
were well- known from the early beginning, generous DI systems have 
persisted in most countries encouraging greater risk- taking by banks due to 
the reduction of market discipline. Latest empirical evidence focused across a 
large panel of countries is revealing. 
 
Protected by DI, banks augmented their leverage and exposure to real estate 
assets, while focused more on short-term deposit for financing; yet such 
banks experienced larger exposure to macroeconomic disturbances, higher 
probability of failure and larger lending contractions during adverse economic 
conditions (Goodspeed, 2015). Generous DI systems amplified bank risk and 
systemic fragility in period prior to the recent financial crisis, although those 
trends were reversed during the crisis (Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt and Zhu, 
2014). DI systems have considerably reduced the sensitivity of deposit 
withdrawals to any decline in banks solvency and enhanced risks (Chernykh 
and Cole, 2011; Karas, Pyle and Schoors, 2013; Yan, Skully, Avram and Vu, 
2014). Generous DI, due to the decrease in market discipline especially from 
large depositors, encourage banks to initiate riskier loans which carry higher 
interest rates and are related with ex-post higher default and delinquency 
rates, without, however, imposing increasing collateral requirements or 
decreasing loan maturities, for the additional risk-taking (Ioannidou and 
Penas, 2010). DI not only encouraged banking sectors to raise their default 
risk by escalating asset risk and leverage, but also contained the expansion of 
non-bank financial markets (Bergbrant, Campbell, Hunter and Owers, 2014). 
 
Regulatory control would be essential to contain moral hazard and leverage 
generated by DI since risk adjusted insurance premiums unaccompanied 
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would not be adequate to eradicate the bank's excessive risk-taking 
behaviour (Mishra and Urrutia, 1995). However, judging from the results, 
such control has not been effectively adopted. Prudential regulation and 
supervision have no demonstrated impact on systemic risk, while market 
discipline with identified stabilising role solely emerged from a mixture of 
limiting deposit insurance and increased disclosure (Barth, Caprio and Levine 
2006). 
 
Conversely, restricted and provisional DI has proven superior to both 
extremes — i.e. unconditional DI and non-DI in theoretical terms (Acharya 
and Thakor, 2016) and on empirical grounds as demonstrated by the 
successful financial policies of limited and provisional protection pursued by 
many countries preceding the World War II (Calomiris, Flandreau and Laeven, 
2016). Thus, the following two questions are inevitable: i) Why do countries 
persist in applying almost complete and enduring protection, notwithstanding 
its poor record in restraining systemic risk? ii) Why prudential regulation 
failed to operate as a risk reduction instrument which could contain the DI 
effects and consequences? 
 
2.3  The theory revised 
DI implies depositors receive interest generated by risk-taking activities 
without any downside outcome in case those risks are realized. Thus, it 
provides an incentive to depositors to make their funds available to banks 
which in turn use these funds to support lending and other risk-taking 
activities. This allows banks to expand their balance sheets, attracting 
inefficiently large volumes of deposits and expanding inefficiently high-risk 
loans. 
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The original economic theory considers DI impact on banks’ lending and risk 
taking activities as a side effect. However, such an impact ought to be 
perceived as a deliberate political objective pursued by a winning political 
alliance. DI is used as political leverage. Domestic political influence plays a 
key role in the realization and design of DI (Demirgu-kane and Laeven, 2008; 
2014). 
 
Generally, DI provides subsidies to banks by reducing the  cost of mobilising 
funds, through deposits rather than other forms of debt or equity and 
consequently allows them to expand their credit activity to a magnitude 
otherwise unattainable. Thus, it benefits specific borrowers by granting 
capital access. It is a transfer subsidy provided to banks but eventually passed 
on, in the form of credit, to politically preferential borrowers, subsequently 
crowding out high productivity investments. It could be an indispensable part 
of an attained political balance to pursue the prevailing interests of bankers, 
depositors and borrowers, since it allows all of them to increase their risk 
taking, at public expense. 
 
In autocratic regimes DI may function as an instrument of attracting deposits 
and subsequently advancing loans to industrial corporations owned by crony 
economic political elites which would otherwise find hard to finance 
(Calomiris and Haber; 2014). 
 
In democratic states, insured credit institutions could also be granted 
particular incentives to lend to politically favoured, though risky functions. 
Governments may utilise banks as the device for directing credit subsidies to 
favoured borrowers since banks are strictly regulated and, consequently, 
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effortlessly manipulated by way of a combination of DI, state incentives for 
various forms of lending, financial restrictions, use of “moral suasion” on 
domestic banks and lenient prudential supervision (Calomiris and Chen, 
2016). In several countries banks focus on real estate by loan provisions for 
risky mortgages is mainly due to policy distortions, taking in DI (Calomiris and 
Haber, 2014). Furthermore, DI coupled with government financial restrictions 
and/or the use of “moral suasion” on domestic banks could induce the latter 
to engage actively in government bonds financing and provide national 
administrations with easier access to capital. 
 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, DI was used as an instrument to uphold 
banks’ lending activity and liquidity to severely hit economies. Drawing on 
IMF-defined episodes of banking crises as shocks to market liquidity over the 
last 25 years reveals a major positive link between sustained loan expansion 
during crises and DI cover for banks. (Ngo, Puente and Virani, 2016). 
 
In principle, prudential regulation and supervision are enacted as a substitute 
for market discipline and therefore may eliminate deposit insurance 
drawbacks in terms of excessive lending and risk-taking. However, in practice, 
the efficiency of regulators and supervisors in disciplining imprudent bankers 
depends on the incentives provided by the political process. Such incentives 
may be inferior to those of uninsured depositors, who incur substantial losses 
in case of bankers’ irresponsible actions. Thus prudential regulation and 
supervision may not provide an equivalent substitute to market discipline. 
Furthermore, regulatory failure is often a predictable consequence of the 
political bargains influence which challenges safety nets and prudential 
regulations safety nets ability to contain insured banks risk taking (Calomiris 
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and Haber, 2014). In case DI is subject to private interests, it is irrational to 
consider that the political process would provide effective prudential 
regulation and supervision to eliminate DI subsidies. 
 
In short, the economic theory considers DI narrowly as a risk sharing 
arrangement amongst banks designed to limit systemic risk in the banking 
sector. In principle DI provides subsidy allowing elevated risk taking and 
therefore generates economic rents which subsequently  should  be shared 
amongst all parties involved. Thus, it should rather be conceived as a broad 
rent-sharing arrangement encompassing the interest of politically favoured 
borrowers along with bankers and depositors. 
 
2.4   Illustrating DI as a rent-sharing arrangement 
Generally, depositors are keen to invest their funds, via intermediation, in 
borrowers’ projects since they foresee that the borrowers’ collateral is of a 
good quality to provide a sufficient return on their deposits. However if the  
depositors foresee a declining collateral value, due to an economic shock, 
inducing borrowers even to default on their loans, they may withdraw funds 
from the investment projects. Nevertheless the shock has not inevitably 
influenced the investment projects’ returns, but merely the share in these 
returns, and more precisely the depositors’ ability to attract a sufficient 
portion of such returns rendering depositors unwilling to continue playing a 
part in the respective projects. In case of a soaring ex-ante bankruptcy risk, 
borrowers can seize such an amount of their projects’ payoffs that cause 
depositors to be reluctant to participate in any contract to always ensure full 
completion of the investment project. Withdrawing funds, even though real 
investment projects’ returns have not declined, leads to a complete 
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investment collapse with severe repercussions for real growth. In economic 
terms it is optimal to prevent depositors from running away from the projects 
by withdrawing their deposits. Completion of borrowers’ projects may 
require an assurance to depositors offering safety of their funds against 
bankruptcy risks. Such an objective can be attained by DI. 
 
Although in certain cases it is generally perceived that perspective loans are 
running at a loss (in terms of their expected repayments not covering their 
initial outlay), the respective projects might be socially desirable generating 
certain externalities. Such projects might be selected by the State, which 
through appropriate regulatory provisions and administrative practices 
attempt at inducing banking institutions to direct their loans towards these 
projects. While banks may not need deposits to create loans, balancing their 
books by attracting customer deposits is usually the lowest cost option. Thus, 
it is efficient depositors providing funds to the banking institution, the later 
extending loans to borrowers and taxpayers covering any losses. Ex-ante, the 
taxpayers are willing to provide DI since the transfers (taking into account the 
generated externalities) that they expect to receive from the socially 
desirable projects (and the accrued generated externalities) compensate for 
their taxes. Following a severe collateral shock, though, taxpayers are ex-post 
discontented, since they bear a large burden to keep lenders floating, DI 
ought not to be discontinued. 
 
Consequently, state-backed DI, in case of a significant decrease in aggregate 
collateral value, generates large conveyance of funds from taxpayers to 
depositors. Several instances exemplify this form of DI as a vital segment of 
banks bailouts and resolutions with extensive transfers from taxpayers to 
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depositors. The single case of bail-in, namely Cyprus, is an exception that 
actually confirms the rule. The main factor leading to the bail-in decision was 
the heavy burden for the insurer – i.e. the State – to bear. 
 
Thus, the DI is a rent-sharing arrangement which encompasses the 
contracting problem between the depositor, the banker, the State and the 
borrower, given that the latter can redirect his investment project’ returns. 
This DI approach converges to the conceptions of: 
i) 'Relationship banking' which refers to the intertemporal   
accumulation of specific information in the hands of the bank, and the 
subsequent development of informational rents, which, if shared by 
both the bank and the borrowers, their relationship upholds (Besanko 
and Thakor, 2004). 
ii) Borrower-lender relationships in the presence of enforcement 
limitations (see for example Hart and Moore, 1998). 
iii) The model of DI operating essentially as insurance (Kocherlakota, 
2001). 
Nevertheless, the above illustrated DI approach covers a wider spectrum 
since it encompasses the interest of all groups: depositors, taxpayers, bankers 
and borrowers. 
 
A key feature of DI is the growth of economic rents in the hands of the banks 
and the borrowers. To the extent that these rents are shared not exclusively 
by the banks and the borrower, but also by the depositors and the taxpayers 
all parties see a value in enduring their relationship. The desire to protect 
such relationships affects the bank's borrowing and lending capacity as well 
as the economic growth. The political weight of any of the individual parties 
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involved plays an important role in the framing of and running the overall 
arrangement. In Cyprus, for instance, the nationality of the depositors played 
a role in the bail-in decision since the banks’ problems were originated by 
foreign deposits serving as the backing for loans to the depositors (Kregel, 
2013). Conversely, in Italy, the DI rent-sharing arrangement encompasses the 
protection of bond holders attained by the use of alternative measures such 
as transfer of ailing banks’ deposits and bonds to viable banks, even if in 
breach of EU State Aid rules, since according to the EU Commission transfer 
of bonds constitute transfer of business (Kiriazidis, 2016). In any case, within 
this rent sharing arrangement providers of funds and depositors in particular 
may pursue their own interests by presenting the other parties with the 
specter of bank runs. 
 
The 2008 financial crisis in Europe triggered by the adverse US financial 
developments which raised doubts about the ability of debtors to serve their 
debts, with sovereigns and banks facing difficulties to roll over their bonds 
and deposits respectively (De Grauwe, 2011). Sovereign creditworthiness 
represents the ultimate source of insurance for the banking system. Drawing 
on the Greek experience – the country worst hit by the financial crisis— 
capital controls were imposed in order to halt banks hemorrhaging deposits, 
given that large depositors in particular engaged in hoarding bank notes and 
capital outflows. In 2015, hoarding cash reached around 25% of the country’s 
money supply M3 (Bank of Greece, 2016). Such a bank run was generated by 
the deterioration of the sovereign creditworthiness along with a new Law 
(3869/2010) on indebted units compelling banks to restructure their loans 
according to new financial circumstances in privileged terms for the 
borrowers allowing them to expropriate considerable amounts of their 
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projects’ payoffs. Yet, the solvency problems of some individual banks appear 
to play only marginal role in causing deposits withdrawals (see Diagram 1). 
Thus, the bank run did not originate from financial difficulties faced by a 
limited number of credit institutions and subsequent spill-over effects 
stemming  from irrational, uninformed, or panicked behaviour in particular of 
small savers. 
 
The DI rent sharing arrangement does not embrace only the design features 
of the DI (such as level and scope of coverage and contribution system) but 
also all the spectrum of regulatory provisions and administrative practices 
governing the operation of all parties involved. Such provisions and 
administrative practices include in general: (a) the prudential treatment of 
banks, (b) the structure for banking resolution and insolvency, (c) the 
framework for business insolvency, and (d) the level of sovereign debt held 
by credit institutions. 
 
In fact, the immense domestic sovereign debt inventory of many banks is a 
particular aspect of the DI arrangement. Most European governments 
consider their ability of using national banking sectors as sovereign debt last 
resort buyers as their prerogative. In May 2016, the Bank of Italy‘s Governor 
highlighted the necessity to “preserve banks’ ability to act as shock absorbers 
in the event of sovereign stress” as a crucial aspect of the national policy 
(Visco, 2016). Even in Germany, the local banks (the Landesbanken) play an 
important role in financing public-sector projects at local or provincial level 
(Veron, 2016). 
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Diagram 1:  Total non-interbank deposits
Application 
for a loan 
facility 
agreement 
by Greece 
(May 3rd, 
2010)
Law on 
indebted units 
(law
3869/2010)
(August 8th, 
2010)
Austerity bill 
passed
(June 29, 2011)
First banking license 
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(Proton Bank, 
October 9th, 2011)
Renegotiations for
bailout programme  
begin
( February 2nd, 2015)
Imposition of Capital 
Controls
(June 28, 2015)
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Since the DI arrangement is structured within a political framework, its 
function may diverge across countries according to the prevailing political 
interests. However, this arrangement can operate effectively given that the 
appropriate level of deposits is mobilized towards this end. Since the 
Eurozone incorporates free mobility of capital which is not restricted even by 
exchange rate changes (which could otherwise isolate the domestic 
economies from foreign disturbances), the national DI arrangements 
inevitably induce fierce competition for deposits amongst the eurozone MS. 
Governments are involved in an uncoordinated policy game wherein decide 
on DI conditions in order to attract deposits which are necessary for the rent-
sharing arrangement to run. 
 
 
3.  European DI as a Game of Strategy 
DI seems to play an essential role in cross-border European banking 
competition. Despite the integration process, differences in certain DI 
conditions (such as the scope and level of coverage) influence cross border 
deposit (capital) flows. In certain cases MSs are involved in an uncoordinated 
policy game wherein opt for particular DI conditions with the intention of 
attract deposits. Thus, such conditions are determined antagonistically with 
severe repercussions for financial stability and economic welfare. Behavior 
relations of conflict and cooperation amongst rational decision makers –the 
MS Governments – played an important role in the evolution and formulation 
of the European DI. The European DI game is a cooperative game since the 
players are capable to form binding commitments externally enforced 
through EU Directives and thus the analysis incorporates all the options 
available to players due to the prospect of externally imposed cooperation. 
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3.1 Prior to the Crisis 
In 1994 the 94/19/EC Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive1 (DGSD) set a 
minimum cover limit of €20,000 with no upper limit. Competitive distortions 
emerged by differences in the coverage level. According to the DGSD banks’ 
branches in host countries were covered by the home DGS. Depositors could 
promptly shift deposits amongst local branches and thus amongst DGSs. 
Nevertheless, most countries opted for the lowest coverage level with certain 
notable exceptions: France (€70,000) and Italy (€100,000). Therefore, prior to 
the crisis, the mass of deposits in the EU were essentially uninsured. 
 
The low level deposit guarantee was an initial policy equilibrium. DI reduces 
the severity of bank losses by diminishing liquidity risk; yet, it involves a 
funding cost (from private or public sources) and generates moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Thus, in periods of financial stability, when there no 
concern for liquidity risk, it implies a net cost to economic welfare and, 
governments opt for unworthy DI. This resembles the initial situation in the 
EU with guarantee levels sufficiently low (€20,000) to be financed by the 
residual value of bank assets, without recourse to additional funds. 
 
Furthermore, the low level explicit DI was initially enacted in the EU mainly by 
the necessity to protect the payment system given the banks’ unique role in 
it, rather than financial stability considerations. In addition, prior to the 
introduction of the Euro, MS could accommodate their economies to foreign 
disturbances by changes in the exchange rate which offer a shield to the 
domestic money supply and therefore tackle liquidity risk. Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
1 DIRECTIVE 94/19/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 30 May 1994 on deposit- 
guarantee schemes. Official Journal of the European Communities No L 135/5 
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introduction of euro and the financial crisis changed the economic landscape. 
The euro has increased international bank competition, while the crisis 
impacted banks in EU countries asymmetrically. 
 
3.2 Following the financial crisis 
Subsequent to the crisis banks liability insurance including DI soared to 
unprecedented levels. More specifically: 
 In 30 September 2008 in Ireland the Government proclaimed, in terms of 
a political commitment, full deposit insurance in biggest 6 domestic 
banks (European Commission, 2010). The justification provided for such 
a move was the international financial crisis and the generated 
uncertainty which provoked substantial deposits withdrawals (Financial 
Times, 30th September 2008). 
 In 3 October 2008 the UK Government announced a rise in coverage level 
from £35,000 to £50,000. Such a rise in coverage level was motivated by 
significant deposit outflow to the insured Irish banks, stressing UK 
banks in Northern Ireland (British Banker Association, 2008). 
 In 5 October 2008 in Germany the government declared (political 
commitment) full guarantee for all deposits in domestic banks. Yet it 
had previously criticized publicly the Irish’s “beggar-thy-neighbour” 
policy. Germany’s shift was induced by significant electronic flows of 
deposits during the previous weekend (The Economist, 9th October, 
2008). 
 In 5 October 2008 the Austrian Government followed suit and 
announced the full guarantee of all deposits in domestic banks. 
Government official stressed explicitly the need to avert the flow of 
Austrian savings to Germany (Reuters, 5th  October, 2008). 
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 In 6 October 2008 in Denmark the Government announced the full 
guarantee of all deposits in Danish banks (Financial Times, 7th October 
2008). In 7 October 2008, in the EcoFin Council meeting in Luxembourg, 
the EU finance ministers decided to: i) increase the minimum guarantee 
level from €20,000 to €50,000 for one year, and ii) set the framework for 
the 2009/14/EC DGSD2  adopting a harmonized level at €100,000 since 
Jan 2011 
 
Obviously, governments engage in a strategic game setting DI levels and 
policies. The explicit actors of this game are depositors, banks and 
governments. Depositors are non-forbearing as far as risk is concerned. In 
absence of Deposit insurance, if their claims’ risk increases, they withdraw 
some of their deposits, contributing to banks’ de-leverage and market 
discipline, or even a bank run, if the risk increase is sufficiently large and 
swift. In case of DI existence, depositors’ incentive shifts from the selection 
of banks to the selection of DI jurisdictions. In this case market discipline is 
removed. Banks are highly competitive. The probability of banking failure 
might be inversely related and vastly sensitive to the level of domestic 
deposits. Attracting deposits from abroad enhances domestic banking 
stability, but undermines stability in foreign countries. Loosing deposits 
compromises domestic banking stability. Governments are welfare 
maximizes. They seek to protect their banking systems from destabilizing 
capital flights and compete for deposits. Their policies aim at attracting 
depositors and DI levels are selected given the choice of other governments. 
 
                                                 
2 DIRECTIVE 2009/14/EC  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  OF  THE  COUNCIL  of  11  March  2009 
amending Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and the payout 
delay.  Official Journal of the European Union L 68/3. 
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A country would unilaterally increase the level of its DI, either in order to 
retain the level of domestic deposits following an economic shock (in this 
respect the rise in the DI level is a means of fending off external disturbances) 
or as a beggar- thy-neighbour policy. The Irish action was clearly a defensive 
response to protect the domestic deposit base rather than as a beggar-thy-
neighbour policy, as claimed by the German Government. Nevertheless, such 
an action would inevitably affect unintentionally other MS. In this respect, 
Germany was rightly distressed by the Irish action which influenced the 
German banking system. 
 
The dominant strategy for each government (player) was to increase the level 
of DI. However, if every government does the same, they all end up worse-
off. It is a clear case of conflict between individual rationality and the 
common good –i.e. a prisoner’s dilemma situation (Amadae, 2016).  
 
The introduction of Euro amplified competitive distortions and scope for 
externalities. The DI seems to play a central role on cross-border banking 
competition with the protection level perceived by the governments as a key 
policy variable affecting the location of deposits. External pressures 
determine significantly the provision of national DI. Differences in coverage 
levels lead not only to flight of deposits from low guarantee countries to 
higher guarantee countries, but also from lower guaranteed banks to higher 
guaranteed banks, which nevertheless operate within the same market. 
Governments engage in a strategic interaction setting DI policies. By trying to 
avert potential destabilizing capital flights they may be forced to level the 
regulatory playing field towards the highest denominator. The looser the 
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coordination, the higher the DI protection prevails, and the more severe the 
implications are, in terms of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
 
Eventually, the mutual benefits from cooperation were recognized and in 
7/10/2008, EcoFin Council meeting the MSs adopted the DGSD providing a 
level of €100,000. Cooperation involves strong positive externalities 
rendering cooperative equilibrium more efficient than non- cooperative ones. 
Since the Governments had increased the guarantee from low levels to full 
guarantee, they would not be able to return to the previous low levels 
without seriously irritating depositors leading to deposits withdrawal (the 
total size of the pie would shrink). 
 
3.3 Repeated strategic game 
The strategic games are barely played merely on one occasion. Most of them 
last for infinitely many moves, with the winner not known until after the 
completion of all those moves. They are repeated games since in future 
periods certain players could exert defection. Acting cooperatively implies 
benefits, yet there are powerful individual incentives to breach joint 
agreements. In the case of DI attracting deposits from foreign banking 
systems is the dominant and a powerful incentive. A key issue in repeated 
games is generally not so much on the best strategy to play the game, but 
whether one player has a winning strategy. Repeated games are played even 
if perfect information exists, the single outcomes are unambiguously "win" or 
"lose" and neither player has a winning strategy (McCain, 2014 and Owen, 
1995). 
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In the context of the new DGSD3 2014/49/EU depositors’ Temporary High 
Balances (THB) coverage represent another aspect of uncoordinated game of 
strategy between MS Governments competing for deposits. The 2014/49/EU 
DGSD made significant progress towards harmonization. However, it 
provided that depositors’ THB emerging from certain transactions of social 
significance (such as real estate and insurance indemnity) should be 
protected by higher coverage levels which should be set taking into account 
the living conditions in the MSs. 
 
Table 1 below presents THB coverage level in various MSs, and table 2 
presents GDP per capita in PPS (purchasing power standard) in various MSs as 
a proxy to their living conditions. Further below, Diagram 2 (combining Table 
1 indicator MSs’ THB coverage levels with Table 2 indicator MSs’ GDP per 
capita) reveals that the two indicators follow completely different patterns. 
Undeniably, some countries while experiencing lower GDP per capita, have 
set higher THB coverage levels. Running a simple statistical test confirms the 
visual presentation. The correlation coefficient between THB coverage levels 
and GDP per Capita is 0.08, indicating essentially no correlation between the 
two indicators. 
                                                 
3 DIRECTIVE 2014/49/EU of 16 April 2014 on DGS.  OJ EU L 173/149. 
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THB Coverage THB Coverage
AT Austria 500,000 IE Ireland 1,000,000
BE Belgium 500,000 LV Latvia 200,000
CY Cyprus 50,000 LT Lithuania 300,000
FI Finland Full MT Malta 500,000
FR France 500,000 PT Portugal Full
DE Germany 500,000 SI Slovenia Full
EL Greece 300,000 ES Spain Full
HU Hungary 50,000 UK United Kingdom 1,000,000 (GBP)
Countries
Table 1
Temporary High Balances Coverage Level in selected Member States
Countries
Source: Individual  countries ' data  on Temporary High Balances  coverage level , May 2016.
 
 
 
 
 
Countries Euro Countries Euro
Austria 35,500 Italy 26,400
Belgium 32,500 Latvia 17,500
Cyprus 22,400 Lithuania 20,600
Finland 30,300 Malta 23,600
France 29,300 Netherlands 35,900
Germany 34,500 Portugal 21,400
Greece 19,900 Slovenia 22,600
Ireland 36,800 Spain 25,000
Table 2
 GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) in Eurozone in 2014
Source: Eurostat Newsrelease, February 2016  
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Thus the conclusion is inevitable: MSs Governments set THB coverage levels 
divergently to their respective living conditions and hence in stark contrast to 
the spirit of the DGSD. Accordingly, an imperative question emerges. What 
was the factor behind THB protection level determination? 
 
To that end a cluster analysis is performed and illustrated in Table 3. Selected 
countries are categorized in clusters according to identical THB coverage 
levels. Subsequently, intra-cluster competition is assessed taking into 
consideration that the degree of competition corresponds to cross border 
banks’ operation via branches. Table 3 reveals that THB coverage levels seem 
to correspond to the structure of cross-border branching which reflects the 
respective degree of competition amongst the MS concerned. In clusters A 
and B, countries C2 and C3 respectively (both in Ranking 1) are the 
competitive grounds. In cluster C, all countries are involved in competition. 
Thus, THB protection levels were set antagonistically. Competition 
determines the level of DI. 
 
National THB protection policies represent a beggar-thy-neighbour” motive 
for setting levels of DI. Such policies aim at increasing the domestic welfare at 
the expense of other MSs because the benefit is realised only by attracting 
deposits from foreign banking systems. It is an instance of the prisoner's 
dilemma since each country individually has an incentive to pursue such a 
policy, rendering finally everyone (including themselves) worse off. 
 
 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 C17
GDP per capita
(euro)
THB Coverage 
Diagram 2: THB coverage and GDP per Capita for selected countries 
GDP per capita for 2014 (PPP) THB Coverage
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
 
Sources: Individual countries’ data on Temporary High Balances coverage level (May 2016), Eurostat News Release (February 2016).    
Note Countries’ GDP per capita are set in ascending order, while their respective THB coverage levels are presented with red dots. For data analysis 
reasons full THB coverage is assigned the highest THB coverage numerical level –i.e 1,000,000. 
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Number of branches from other countries 
within the cluster as a percentage of total 
Eurozone branches in Host country
Ranking
C1 11.7% 3
C2 27.3% 1
C3 36.4% 1
C4 7.2% 7
C5 56.6% 1
C6 51.4% 1
C7 38.7% 1
C8 61.5% 1
C9 71.4% 1
- Individual countries data on THB Coverage Level, May 2016.
Sources
Cluster 
A
Cluster 
B
Cluster 
C
Table 3
THB Coverage Level and Cross Border Operation via Branches in Selected Member States
1,000,000              
500,000                  
Full coverage
Clusters Countries
THB Coverage 
Level
Intra-cluster competition
Calculations by the Author
- Data on branches: European Banking Authority.
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The developments above lead inevitably to a number of essential questions: 
i) Is the current situation in equilibrium? 
ii) In case a high coverage country bank expands via branches in a low coverage 
country, would the latter react by raising its coverage level irrespective of 
cost and consequences? 
iii) Should a bank’s policy expansion determine the coverage level in a certain 
country? 
iv) What are the implications in terms of moral hazard and adverse selection? 
v) Conversely,  would  an  efficient  low  coverage  country  bank  find  any  
expansion  via branches in a high coverage country hindered due to the 
difference in coverage levels? 
vi) Does this constitute somewhat a barrier to entry? 
These concerns highlight the merits of coordinated equilibrium versus non-
coordinated equilibrium. 
 
In effect, in the case of DI, Governments’ interaction seems to involve tit-for-
tat trigger strategies. They act in the same way as their adversaries 
previously. Some governments defected on the agreement and as response 
the other governments reacted in a tit-for-tat row to punish defectors by 
stopping to cooperate. Since the latter also defects themselves on 
cooperation the eventual outcome is mutual defection (defect-defect). The 
key factor contributing towards cooperation via trigger strategies is the 
exceeding size of punishment over defecting gain. Nonetheless, in this 
particular case, the defecting gain (in terms of attracted deposits net of the 
cost of raising DI) as well as the size of the punishment (in terms of losing the 
deposit attracted by defecting in the first place) cannot be calculated 
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precisely. In such an uncertain framework the outcome is inevitably towering 
DI protection levels. 
 
Is harmonization of the explicit DI conditions as induced by the EU Directives 
sufficient to attain uniform DI provision throughout the EU and therefore 
avert antagonism for deposits? Up until now, State antagonism on deposits 
involved coverage. Nevertheless, in reality there are several aspects of DI that 
may affect deposits’ protection and as a result deposit flows. The credibility 
of DI plays a crucial role in this respect. Such credibility, given the low 
capitalization level of domestic DGSs, depends on their particular backstops’ 
credibility and consequently on the vigour of state finances. Thus, the game 
can be repeated indefinitely. 
 
 
4. Sovereigns’ Fiscal Status as Determinants of Deposits 
 
This section seeks to assess the sovereigns’ fiscal strength on the credibility of 
DI across the Eurozone and thus depositors’ perceptions of explicit DI. This in 
turn provides significant insight on the existence of moral hazard and adverse 
selection. 
 
Diagram 3 presents domestic and foreign deposit trends versus tier-1 ratio 
and deposit interest rates in selected Eurozone countries. Sovereign risk is 
based on the average ratings of Moody’s, Fitch and Standard and Poor’s. 
High risk is defined as BBB or worse. Tier–1 ratio is used as a proxy of the 
banking sectors’ financial strength since is superior4 to other banks 
                                                 
4 Tier -1 ratio is defined as Tier -1 capital over risk-weighted assets. Tier 1 capital generally refers to equity 
capital and disclosed reserves (including retained earnings) and is viewed to be of higher quality than total 
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capitalization indicators and is the less procyclical. One year maturity deposit 
interest rate is used as a proxy of the interest rate. Country specific, instead 
of bank specific, data manipulation was selected due to persisting 
fragmentation of the Eurozone banking sectors. ECB financial integration 
indicators, both quality and quantity based, signal relatively low levels of 
retail banking integration in the Eurozone, despite the ECB’s non-standard 
monetary policy measures (European Central Bank, 2016). 
 
The diagram reveals that in all countries deposits from foreign euro area 
counterparties tend to follow wider volatility than deposits of domestic 
counterparties.  High risk sovereigns experience a marked outflow of deposits 
from foreign euro area counterparts, while low risk sovereigns experience the 
opposite course despite the substantial improvement in the capitalization of 
the banking sector and their relatively higher deposit interest rates. 
 
The above findings demonstrate that the Eurozone banking sectors are 
characterized by the existence of: regulatory subsidy in the form of implicit, 
though effective, DI; perception of such subsidy; uneven level of confidence 
depending on the fiscal status of the respective MSs; moral hazard; and, 
adverse selection. Furthermore, the relationship between the timing of 
changes in deposits and changes in interest rates is important. If the change 
in interest rates preceded the change in deposits, then an increase in 
deposits should have been associated with a relative increase in the interest 
rate. Whereas, if the change in deposits preceded the change in interest 
                                                                                                                                                                       
capital. The latter includes items such as hybrid debt instruments, including cumulative preferred shares 
and other “innovative” capital instruments, and also longer-term subordinated debt. Total risk-weighted 
assets encompass exposure to credit, market and operational risk. 
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rates, then an increase in deposits should have been associated with a 
relative reduction in the interest rate. 
 
Since the low risk sovereigns are characterized by relatively lower interest 
rates this implies that the flow of deposits preceded the decline in interest 
rates. Thus, it is deposit flows  that determine the interest rates (rather than 
vice versa) and consequently the financing conditions in the respective 
countries. This is supportive to the argument that DI is used as an instrument 
to uphold banks’ lending activity and liquidity to domestic economies.
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Diagram 3: Domestic and foreign deposits’
1 
trends (left axis) versus tier 1 ratio and 1-
year deposit interest rates (right axis) in selected Eurozone countries. 
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Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
1 
Deposits of non- financial corporations, households and non-profit institutions serving households (Index: 
2008=100). Foreign deposits refer to other Euro area member states. 
2 The risk is based on the average ratings by Moody’s, Fitch and Standard and Poor’s. High risk is defined as 
BBB or worse. 
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In order to provide a thorough analysis highlighting the effects of sovereign 
risk on deposits across the Eurozone, a model is employed which is similar to 
the research methods in evaluating moral hazard in the area of DI presented 
in the recent literature (e.g. Karas, Pyle, and Schoors, 2013; and Yan, Skully, 
Avram and Vu, 2014; Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016). Such methods examine 
the response of depositors to the specific balance sheet characteristics of the 
respective banks and model the change in deposits reacting to specific ratios 
capturing the solvency of these banks. Cross-sectional time-series data (Panel 
data) analysis is used. This is a dataset in which the behaviour of entities is 
observed across time (Kohler and Kreuter, 2009). Panel data allows control 
for variables which cannot be observed or measured such as variables that 
change over time but not across entities (Baltagi, 2008). 
 
Deposits are modelled using a linear model. The equation for this model is: 
Yit = β0 Yit-1 + β1Xit + β2Zit + β3 Dit + αi + uit 
Where: 
- αi (i=1….n) is the unknown intercept for each entity i.e. country 
- Yit is the dependent variable-i.e. DEPOSITS where i = entity and t = time 
- Xit represents the independent variable- i.e. TIER-1 RATIO 
- Zit represents the independent variable- i.e. SOLVENCY RATIO 
- Dit represents the independent variable – i.e. SOVEREIGN RISK 
- β is the respective coefficient for every independent variable 
- uit  is the error term 
 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 provide data for the variables: Deposits, Tier-1 ratio and 
Solvency ratio respectively. The independent variable Sovereign risk 
presented in Table 7 is a binary variable, taking values: 0 for high risk 
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sovereigns and 1 for low risk sovereigns. The definitions of these variables are 
presented in Appendix I. The model captures the national banking sectors in 
their entirety rather than reflecting on individual banks in correspondence to 
the fragmentation of the national banking sectors as manifested by the ECB 
financial integration indicators. Various statistical Tests are performed. 
 
 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Austria 278,020           297,032        302,976        302,683        315,911        321,267        328,126        334,665        341,325        357,817        
Belgium 422,382           444,181        454,914        466,070        473,441        496,300        505,120        524,138        536,117        536,018        
Cyprus 33,547             40,393          42,144          49,290          48,929          48,428          35,099          34,045          35,424          39,197          
Finland 95,899             107,898        109,245        118,026        125,211        136,282        144,199        148,348        152,063        151,579        
France 1,426,339       1,513,813    1,606,738    1,733,500    1,870,912    1,937,676    1,994,874    2,029,149    2,153,594    2,255,324    
Germany 2,620,069       2,822,603    2,875,710    2,972,771    3,090,965    3,142,897    3,119,582    3,190,508    3,298,325    3,404,849    
Greece 201,826           233,587        244,237        215,639        180,085        167,930        170,874        167,526        129,441        129,073        
Ireland 216,557           217,173        219,180        201,067        196,298        197,013        206,085        195,403        205,252        206,308        
Italy 1,048,410       1,141,247    1,209,695    1,454,560    1,393,440    1,502,251    1,525,810    1,546,452    1,620,245    1,691,542    
Luxembourg 224,190           207,470        203,081        200,956        215,103        214,019        224,855        245,773        266,455        278,147        
Malta 8,521                8,704             8,762             9,385             10,636          11,570          13,014          16,013          17,168          18,617          
Netherlands 745,167           792,271        814,399        820,061        857,415        889,243        885,688        936,008        927,317        955,375        
Portugal 175,674           196,992        209,649        226,165        232,805        210,637        213,072        211,493        214,584        217,578        
Slovakia 31,529             36,821          34,696          36,462          38,147          40,629          42,560          43,543          47,538          50,207          
Slovenia 18,246             19,133          19,988          20,806          21,330          20,867          20,795          22,133          23,141          24,679          
Spain 1,463,765       1,656,962    1,686,023    1,730,187    1,679,411    1,521,972    1,496,564    1,478,159    1,451,732    1,450,398    
Source
ECB MFI Balance Sheets
Table 4: Eurozone deposits of non-MFIs excluding central government sector
(EUR million, outstanding amounts at end of period)
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Austria 7.92% 9.55% 10.04% 10.30% 11.26% 11.85% 12.28% 13.16%
Belgium 10.84% 12.64% 14.14% 13.25% 14.75% 16.92% 15.50% 17.01%
Cyprus 8.08% 9.26% 10.65% 6.16% 4.48% 10.67% 14.20% 15.46%
Finland 13.22% 13.40% 13.55% 14.71% 14.84% 15.25% 16.21% 20.42%
France 8.40% 10.08% 10.74% 10.94% 13.34% 13.15% 13.10% 13.83%
Germany 8.79% 10.21% 11.28% 11.56% 13.76% 15.16% 14.62% 15.28%
Greece 8.46% 11.15% 11.27% 9.37% 7.47% 13.12% 13.83% 16.31%
Ireland 7.96% 7.71% 7.65% 16.32% 14.90% 13.36% 15.56% 15.59%
Italy 6.88% 8.33% 8.75% 9.62% 10.66% 10.52% 11.80% 12.33%
Luxembourg 10.40% 15.57% 17.58% 14.96% 21.20% 28.29% 25.96% 27.63%
Malta 11.83% 14.10% 13.34% 13.29% 12.65% 12.52% 12.13% 15.54%
Netherlands 9.55% 12.42% 11.84% 11.74% 12.12% 12.48% 15.05% 16.19%
Portugal 6.18% 7.48% 7.91% 8.10% 11.01% 11.71% 10.96% 12.25%
Slovakia 21.89% 20.92% 19.18% 16.86% 16.31% 17.26% 16.59% 17.42%
Slovenia 8.72% 8.86% 8.26% 8.82% 9.07% 12.95% 18.94% 19.27%
Spain 8.10% 9.32% 9.64% 10.19% 9.68% 11.74% 11.73% 12.64%
Source
ECB Satistical Data Warehouse
Table 5: Tier 1 ratio
(tier 1 capital / total risk exposure amount )
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Austria 11.42% 13.24% 13.59% 13.86% 14.96% 15.84% 16.25% 16.54%
Belgium 16.46% 15.74% 17.52% 16.68% 16.74% 19.83% 18.18% 20.17%
Cyprus 10.96% 12.07% 12.00% 7.29% 5.23% 11.39% 14.55% 15.79%
Finland 13.94% 14.37% 14.52% 15.73% 16.16% 16.37% 18.11% 23.02%
France 10.36% 12.24% 12.57% 12.25% 14.01% 15.03% 15.27% 16.53%
Germany 12.59% 13.91% 15.21% 15.70% 17.42% 18.71% 17.17% 17.79%
Greece 9.92% 11.87% 12.26% 10.07% 7.89% 13.51% 14.06% 16.45%
Ireland 10.80% 10.87% 10.43% 17.74% 16.57% 15.10% 17.82% 18.09%
Italy 10.40% 11.75% 12.20% 12.80% 13.56% 13.76% 14.30% 14.86%
Luxembourg 14.10% 20.95% 22.22% 17.61% 27.09% 32.61% 26.86% 28.35%
Malta 13.27% 17.31% 17.28% 16.96% 16.82% 16.30% 14.80% 18.45%
Netherlands 11.88% 14.93% 13.92% 13.42% 14.20% 14.89% 17.95% 20.11%
Portugal 9.14% 10.39% 10.20% 9.48% 12.52% 13.22% 11.89% 13.02%
Slovakia 21.91% 20.93% 20.63% 17.84% 17.46% 17.94% 17.05% 17.86%
Slovenia 12.02% 11.82% 11.28% 11.69% 10.78% 13.21% 19.02% 19.38%
Spain 11.30% 12.22% 11.87% 12.12% 11.36% 13.16% 13.54% 14.48%
Euro area 11.48% 12.85% 13.14% 13.09% 14.28% 15.49% 15.63% 16.66%
Source
ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
Table 6: Solvency ratio
(own funds / total risk exposure amount )
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Countries Risk Category
C1 1
C2 1
C3 0
C4 1
C5 1
C6 1
C7 0
C8 0
C9 1
C10 1
C11 1
C12 1
C13 0
C14 1
C15 0
C16 0
Source
Ratings of Moody’s, Fitch and Standard and Poor’s  
Calculations by the author 
Table 7:  Sovereign risk -binary variable
 
 
Test 1 is performed i) as a pooled regression and with no cross sections, ii) 
with two independent variables, TIER 1 RATIO and SOLVENCY RATIO. 
(Sovereignty risk variable is not included). The first Test runs as pooled 
regression, and essentially captures all Eurozone as one country, while it does 
not control for unpredictable events (shocks) that affects the national 
economies. This test is based on the assumption that all countries are 
homogeneous and there are no shocks affecting the national economies. 
However, this assumption does not appear correct since firstly, the Eurozone 
countries are subject to the same regulation and monetary policy, but fiscal 
policies to some extent diverge and secondly, there are changes in 
macroeconomic factors and regulation. The results of this Test are presented 
in Panel 1 revealing statistically significant results for the two independent 
variables TIER 1 RATIO and SOLVENCY RATIO since their respective probability 
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values are less than the significance level (5%). Thus, the two ratios, under 
the above assumptions, are statistically significant predictors of deposits. 
 
Test 2 is performed i) under period fixed effects, which captures changes in 
each year that were common to all countries and thus controls for 
macroeconomic factors and changes in regulation, and ii ) with two 
independent variables TIER 1 RATIO and SOLVENCY RATIO (Sovereignty risk 
variable is not included). This test is performed under the underlined 
assumption that all countries are homogeneous and there are time shocks 
affecting the national economies, but such shocks are common to all. This 
assumption is partially correct since the Eurozone countries are subject to the 
same Regulation and monetary policy, but fiscal policies to some extent 
diverge. The results of this Test are presented in Panel 2 revealing statistically 
significant results for the two independent variables TIER 1 RATIO and 
SOLVENCY RATIO (significance level 5%). Thus, the two ratios, under the 
above assumptions, are statistically significant predictors of deposits. 
However, in this test, the value of F-statistic may imply that that the 
proposed regression model does not fit the data well. 
 
Test 3 is performed i) as a pooled regression and with no cross sections, and 
ii) with three independent variables included TIER 1 RATIO, SOLVENCY   
RATIO   and SOVEREIGNTY RISK. The Test essentially captures all Eurozone as 
one country, implying that all countries are homogeneous while it does not 
control for unpredictable shocks that affects the national economies. The 
underlined assumption is to a degree correct, at least as far as the 
homogeneity is concerned, since the Eurozone countries are subject to the 
same regulation and monetary policy; while divergences in fiscal policies are 
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incorporated to the model via the independent variable sovereignty risk; 
however, there are shocks affecting national economies. The results of this 
Test are presented in Panel 3 revealing statistically significant results for the 
independent variable SOVEREIGNTY RISK and statistically insignificant results 
for the independent variable SOLVENCY RATIO. 
 
The fourth Test 4 is performed i) under period fixed effects, which captures 
changes in each year that were common to all countries and thus control 
for macroeconomic factors and changes in regulation, and ii) with   three   
independent   variables   included   TIER   1   RATIO,   SOLVENCY   RATIO   and 
SOVEREIGNTY RISK. The Test implies that all countries are homogeneous and 
there are time shocks affecting the national economies, but such shocks are 
common to all. The underline assumption appears correct since the Eurozone 
countries are subject to the same regulation and monetary policy, but 
divergences in fiscal policies are incorporated to the model via the 
independent variable sovereignty risk. The results of this Test are presented 
in Panel 4, revealing statistically significant results for the independent 
variable SOVEREIGNTY RISK and statistically insignificant results for the 
independent variable SOLVENCY RATIO. These results demonstrate that when 
sovereignty risk is incorporated into the model not only it is a statistically 
significant predictor for deposits but also renders the solvency ratio 
statistically insignificant. Thus, the sovereignty risk absorbs the explanatory 
property out of the solvency ratio. 
 
Furthermore, between Test 2 and Test 4 there is a large increase in R-squared 
when the variable SOVEREIGNTY RISK is added to the model. This change in 
R-squared represents the amount of unique variance that each variable 
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explains above and beyond the other variables in the model. The adjusted R-
squared also increases indicating that the new term improves the model 
more than would be expected by chance. These findings provide a strong 
support to the argument of the existence of perception of regulatory subsidy 
based on the fiscal status of the government, which increases risk by 
removing market discipline and enhancing moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Standardised coefficients represent the mean change in the 
response given a one standard deviation change in the predictor. Sovereign 
risk coefficient (dummy variable with value 1) implies that, other things being 
equal, there is a ‘premium’ of additional 636,104 million euro in deposits in 
low risk countries. 
 
Banking institutions, operating under the umbrella of implicit, though 
effective, DI provided by fiscally strong MS, can attract deposits away from 
their counterparts in fiscally weak MS. This in turn would prolong the legacy 
of the crisis. It might also continue to exert deflationary dynamics in the 
Eurozone (De Grauwe, 2016). 
 VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STATISTIC PROB. COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STATISTIC PROB. COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STATISTIC PROB. COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STATISTIC PROB.
DEPOSITS  t-1 801498.9 300919.9 2.663495 0.0088 1017822. 328284.2 3.100429 0.0024 956857.7 292165.2 3.275054 0.0014 1252663. 318247.0 3.935800 0.0001
ΤΙΕR -1 RATIO -12942060 5306930. -2.438709 0.0161 -17493462 5847006. -2.991867 0.0034 -7839034 53022187. -1.478453 0.1418 -12569855 5711911. -2.200639 0.0297
SOLVENCY 
RATIO
10191719 5310738. 1.919078 0.0573 12652335 5570232. 2.271420 0.0249 2393109. 5575497. 0.429219 0.6685 4258799. 5756768. 0.739790 0.4609
SOVEREIGN RISK 582282.1 169179.0 3.441811 0.0008 636104.2 171701.7 3.704705 0.0003
R-squared 0.052955 0.084541 0.135540 0.180655
Adjusted R-
squared
0.037803 0.014717 0.114625 0.110625
S.E.of 
regression
840218.8 850238.5 805979.3  807797.8
Sum squared 
resid
8.82Ε+13 8.53Ε+13 8.06Ε+13 7.63Ε+13
F-statistic 3.494777 1.210780 6.480695 2.579698
Prob   (F-
statistic)
0.033354 0.294859 0.000413 0.007367
Table 8: Regression Analyses outputs
Test 1: Restricted Model (pooled regression) Test 2: Unrestricted Model (fixed effect) Test 3: Restricted Model (pooled regression Test 4: Unrestricted Model (fixed effect)
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5. The European Deposit Insurance Scheme Proposal  
 
In June 2015, the Five Presidents Report set the stage for the launching of the 
third pillar of the Banking Union: a fully-fledged European Deposit Guarantee 
System with appropriate risk- reduction measures, alongside bank 
supervision and resolution. 
 
In line with the report, in November 2015 the EU Commission published a 
legislative proposal for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS)5 jointly 
with risk-reduction measures. The EU Commission’s proposal involved the 
establishment of EDIS over time and in three phases: 
1.  Re-insurance  phase:  national  DGSs  could  access  EDIS  funds  only  
when  it  had  first exhausted all its own resources (2016 – 2020). 
2.  Coinsurance phase: a national scheme would not be required to exhaust 
its own funds before accessing EDIS funds. EDIS would contribute to loss 
cover (2020 – 2024). 
3.  Full insurance phase: complete coverage by 2024 onwards, to align EDIS 
with the Single Resolution Fund and the requirements of the current DGS 
Directive (see Table 9). 
 
Economic institutions consider the EDIS proposal in strictly economic terms. 
More specifically: The EU Commission promotes the introduction of EDIS (risk 
sharing) and the implementation of risk-reduction measures in parallel. 
According to the EU Commission, “EDIS would increase the resilience of the 
Banking Union against future financial crises by reducing the vulnerability of 
national DGSs to large local shocks and further reducing the link between 
                                                 
5 Proposal for a Regulation to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, COM/2015/0586 final - 
2015/0270 (COD), published on 24 November 2015. 
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banks and their home sovereign. [It] can help to reassure depositors across 
the Banking Union and so reduce the risk of bank runs and increase 
financial stability. [It] is the logical complement of elevating responsibility 
for bank supervision and resolution to the Banking Union level.”6 
 
According to the European Central Bank, “… EDIS is the necessary third pillar 
to complete the Banking Union, following the establishment of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). 
An EDIS would bring benefits resulting from risk diversification and is more 
likely to be able to withstand shocks, since risks would be spread more 
widely across a larger pool of financial institutions, and individual pay-out 
events would therefore be less likely to overwhelm the capacity of the 
system”.7 
 
According to the International Monetary Fund, “[…] [A] common deposit 
insurance and a common fiscal backstop [are] essential to completing the 
banking union. […] The EDIS is a step towards breaking bank – sovereign 
risk links. It is also linked to member states’ implementation of the Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD) and with a gradually increasing 
insurance coverage.”8 
 
Conversely, the EP promotes a more cautious and conditional approach 
which fits more to the political nature of DI. In order to facilitate allegedly a 
broad majority within the Parliament, the EP Rapporteur in November 2016, 
                                                 
6 Communication  from the Commission  "Towards  the  completion of the Banking Union",  Strasbourg, 
24.11.2015, (link) [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52015DC0587] 
7 Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 April 2016, (link) 
[https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2016_26_f_sign.pdf] 
8 IMF Country Report No. 16/219: Euro Area Policies (July 2016), IMF Executive Board Concludes 2016 
Article IV Consultation on Euro Area Policies 
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in its draft EDIS proposal9, transforms the substance (by incorporating only 
two implementation phases) and the timeline of the Commission proposal 
(see Table 8). While a reinsurance period would initiate in 2019, the second 
and final phase would be launched in 2024 the earliest and solely subject to 
certain strict conditions such as: 
i) The  complete  implementation  of  the  international  standard  for  Total  
Loss  Absorbing Capacity (TLAC), for Global Systemically Important Banks 
(G-SIBs), and of revised rules in relation to a minimum requirement for 
own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL), for all banks. 
ii) The full application, of a harmonized insolvency ranking for credit 
institutions, in relation to subordinated debt. 
iii) The complete implementation of a harmonized framework for business 
insolvency, in order to avert and better manage non-performing loans. 
iv) The implementation of legislation introducing the moratorium powers to 
supervisors and/or resolution authorities regarding credit institutions 
v) The implementation of a binding leverage ratio requirement. 
vi) The implementation of a revised prudential treatment of sovereign debt 
held by credit institutions. 
 
Differences do not involve solely implementation phases and conditionality. 
In the EU Commission approach a common DGS Fund is envisaged with 
complete 100% post-2024 funding. Conversely, in the EP approach the 
common Fund will coexist along with national Funds. Funding provisions from 
the national DGSs and EDIS will follow a precise hierarchy. More specifically 
the proposal essentially involves the establishment of a re-insurance scheme 
                                                 
9 Draft proposal: Working Document on EDIS, 16.6.2016, (EP link) 
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-deeper-and-fairer-economic- and-monetary-
union/file-european-deposit-insurance-scheme-(edis)] 
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for national DGSs not before 2024 at the earliest. During this phase, such a 
scheme will only contribute to national DGS liquidity shortfall, without 
offering any loss coverage, contrary to the EU Commission proposal. EDIS will 
possess loss absorbing capacity after 2024 not only under strict conditionality 
but also national DGS financial means are depleted (see Diagrams 4-6). 
 
The EP proposal incorporates a different logic: DI is deemed partially a 
national and partially a European affair. Thus it sustains the present 
asymmetric national DI framework with diverse level of depositor confidence 
across the Eurozone. Furthermore, the EP proposed scheme will be complete 
in 2029 at the earliest, which does not coincide with the BU framework of 
supervision and resolution and in this respect it fails to align liability for 
depositor protection and control over the key factors influencing depositor 
risk. 
 
Differences in approaches reflect divergent views. Economic institutions view 
DI narrowly and as a risk-sharing arrangement, anticipating the broad 
benefits of mutualisation in terms of reducing the overall potential for 
significant financial loss to any one entity. Yet, the EP, being a political 
institution, reflects on the DI rent-sharing arrangement in its entirety, 
considering the economic and political consequences such mutualisation 
entails, in terms of dividing up the costs associated with risks and financial 
losses among national DGSs and consequently national banking sectors. The 
strict conditionality incorporated in the EP Rapporteur assimilates important 
aspects of such an arrangement determining the distribution of rent amongst 
the parties involved. 
  45 
Table 9: European Commission and European Parliament approaches to EDIS 
CD = Covered Deposits / FM = Financial Means of national DGS according to its funding path / RC = Recovered amount / EpC =  Ex-post contributions  
Years 
European Commission European Parliament (de Lange report) 
Phase 
Funding path  
(% of CD)1 Liquidity shortfall 
coverage 
Excess loss coverage 
(capital) 
Phase 
Funding path  
(% of CD)1 Liquidity shortfall 
coverage 
Excess loss coverage 
(capital) 
EDIS 
National 
DGS 
EDIS 
National 
DGS 
2017 
Re-
insurance 
0.004 0.14 
20% 
of 
CD – FM – EpC2 
20% 
of 
CD – RC – FM – EpC3 
 0.05 0.05   
2018 0.005 0.21  0.10 0.10   
2019 0.007 0.28 
Re-
insurance 
0.15 0.15 20% of CD - 
2020 
Co-
insurance 
0.12 0.28 20% of CD 20% of CD – RC 0.20 0.20 40% of CD - 
2021 0.24 0.26 
40% of CD 
 
40% of CD - RC 0.25 0.25 60% of CD - 
2022 0.40 0.20 
60% of CD 
 
60% of CD - RC 0.30 0.30 80% of CD - 
2023 0.59 0.11 
80% of CD 
 
80% of CD - RC 0.35 0.35 100% of CD - 
2024 
Full 
insurance 
0.8 0 100% 100% 
Insurance 
 
(Under 
strict 
condition-
ality) 
0.40 0.40 100% of CD 20% of CD – RC – FM 
2025 0.8 0 100% 100% 0.40 0.40 100% of CD 40% of CD – RC – FM 
2026 0.8 0 100% 100% 0.40 0.40 100% of CD 60% of CD – RC – FM 
2027 0.8 0 100% 100% 0.40 0.40 100% of CD 80% of CD – RC – FM 
2028 0.8 0 100% 100% 0.40 0.40  100% of CD – RC – FM 
1
 Assuming universal target level of 0.8% of covered deposits and even annual distribution 
2
 Ex-post contributions the DGS can raise within 3 days 
3
 Ex-post contributions the DGS can raise within 1 year 
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Diagram 4: EDIS warranty of DGSs liquidity shortfall
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Diagram 5: EDIS warranty of DGSs excess loss
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1. In EU Commission apporach a common DGS Fund is envisaged with post -2024 funding 100%. 
2. In EU Parliament approach the common Fund will coexist along with national Funds. Funding provisions from the national 
DGSs and EDIS will follow a precise hierarchy. Specifically, post -2028 EDIS funding will be 100% minus the national DGSs financi al 
means.
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DI is high politics. Given the present level of political integration in the 
Eurozone, the only feasible form of EDIS is one relying mainly on liquidity 
support with limited mutualisation –i.e. the form envisaged in the EP 
approach. The political motivation in the Eurozone is far from allowing 
the taxpayer of one MS supporting the depositor in another MS.  
 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Most of the irrationalities of the present DI arrangements in Eurozone 
emerge by the combination of unrestricted capital (including deposits) 
flows and fragmented national banking sectors. In this setting, the EU 
Commission proposes the enactment of an EDIS with emphasis on DGSs 
resilience enhancement and sovereign-bank nexus erosion. 
 
The EDIS proposal was strongly welcomed by some MSs, but it met tough 
resistance by some other MSs with this divergence reflecting differences 
in the respective payoffs, positive for the former but negative for the 
latter. Opposing countries apprehension entails the risk-sharing inherent 
to EDIS which could be subjugated by destitute governments. The 
concern is that EDIS could loosen the government financing conditions 
and enhance moral hazard. Furthermore opposing to EDIS countries 
attract considerable “benefits” by the depositors’ lack of confidence in 
their counterparts and such benefits would disappear in case of EDIS. 
Although EDIS overall is beneficial from a pan EU point of view, it is a 
distribution game amongst MSs. In this respect it would turn into a sub-
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game within the EU. In political terms, this process might contribute to 
resentment and even confrontation. 
In economic terms, competition for deposits would bring into 
competition not only the DI in its explicit and narrow sense, but also the 
national DI arrangements in their entirety. This implies that there would 
be increasing competitive pressure on various aspects of these 
arrangements such as the prudential treatment of banks, the structure 
for banking insolvency and the framework for business insolvency. The 
increasing competitive pressures might enhance regulatory subsidy and 
the value of rent the DI arrangement generates, but also affect the 
distribution of such rent in favour to depositors and at the expense of 
other parties involved. However, if the market is allowed to determine 
the outcome in an area where there are market failures, such a as 
principal-agent costs, moral hazard and adverse selection, it would lead 
inevitably to sub-optimal results. 
 
More specifically, given that the EU rules (despite the process towards 
establishing the BU) still provide to the national authorities ample 
discretionary power with respect to banks crisis management tools 
employed. These authorities may resort to resolution instruments rather 
than insolvency as preferable option to tackle failing banks. In the former 
case full protection to depositors and to other providers of capital (such 
as bondholders) would be offered even with resort to national fiscal 
funds, while in the latter case the scope of protection and level of 
coverage will be contained to the official DI limits utilising mostly or 
solely funds obtained from the banking sector. This implies mainly full 
and unconditional protection rather than limited and conditional  
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protection which constitute, in both theoretical and empirical terms, the 
optimal guiding principle. Regulatory subsidy and rent-seeking behaviour 
would persist and even be enhanced at the expense of the society as a 
whole in terms of elevated systemic risk. 
 
In a nutshell, national policies allowed to be pursued with considerable 
discretionary power and in the context of increasing competition for 
deposits would run contrary to certain objectives of the BU, such as 
reducing the misjudgement of risks by the banking sector, limiting the 
bank-sovereign loop and eliminating the vicious link between banks and 
public finances. 
 
The European Institutions should act to attain a high quality integration 
throughout the Eurozone DI, removing its design features from interest 
groups’ influences and along the optimal guiding principle analysed 
above. Unless the European Institutions act, then the Eurozone will 
ultimately be seen to have failed to complete the BU in an important 
part, namely the market for deposits. Such a failure will not be a marginal 
failure, but a major failure of the programme: it was precisely from the 
integration of this sector which dominates the European financial system 
that much of the benefit was expected to arise. 
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Appendix 
 
Definition of Variables 
 
The independent variable Tier -1 ratio (Table 5) is defined as Tier -1 
capital over total risk exposure amount (i.e. risk-weighted assets). Tier 1 
capital generally refers to equity capital and disclosed reserves (including 
retained earnings) and is viewed to be of higher quality than total capital. 
The latter includes items such as hybrid debt instruments, including 
cumulative preferred shares and other “innovative” capital instruments, 
and also longer-term subordinated debt. Total risk-weighted assets 
encompass exposure to credit, market and operational risk. The higher 
the Tier-1 ratio the lower is the likelihood of default. 
 
The independent variable Solvency ratio (Table 5) is defined as own 
funds over total risk exposure amount (i.e. risk-weighted assets). The 
own funds of banks consist of original own funds (tier 1) and additional 
own funds (tier 2) which includes items such as hybrid debt instruments 
and longer-term subordinated debt. The own funds of banks are subject 
to the deductions and prudential filters. Total risk-weighted assets 
encompass exposure to credit, market and operational risk. The higher 
the Solvency ratio the lower is the likelihood of default. 
 
The independent variable Sovereign risk (Table 7) is a binary variable. It 
takes values: 0 for high risk sovereigns (defined as BBB or worse based on 
the average ratings of Moody’s, Fitch and Standard and Poor’s) and 1 for 
   57 
low risk sovereigns — defined as better than BBB based on the above 
standards. It is taken for every single year as an average during the year. 
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